Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 112
Issue 3 Summer

Article 4

Summer 2022

Getting Out of Traffic: Applying White Collar Investigative Tactics
to Increase Detection of Sex Trafficking Cases
Evan Binder

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Evan Binder, Getting Out of Traffic: Applying White Collar Investigative Tactics to Increase Detection of
Sex Trafficking Cases, 112 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 631 (2022).

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of
Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons.

0091-4169/22/11203-0631
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY
Copyright © 2022 by Evan Binder

Vol. 112, No. 3
Printed in U.S.A.

COMMENTS
GETTING OUT OF TRAFFIC: APPLYING
WHITE COLLAR INVESTIGATIVE
TACTICS TO INCREASE DETECTION OF
SEX TRAFFICKING CASES
Evan Binder*
When federal authorities investigate sex trafficking, three realities are
consistently present. First, most sex trafficking investigations begin in
response to an individual affirmatively bringing evidence to investigators.
Second, the elements required to prove a someone guilty of sex trafficking
under federal sex trafficking laws incentivize prosecutors to rely on victim
testimony and their cooperation throughout the life of the investigation. This
can be, and often is, psychologically traumatizing for the victim. Third, most
cases are viewed through a traditional tripartite structure, involving the
trafficker, the victim(s), and the purchasers of the sex act (johns). However,
recent high-profile sex trafficking indictments of Jeffrey Epstein and the
lifestyle brand NXIVM demonstrate that trafficking schemes are frequently
much more complex than that tripartite structure and involve many other
individuals who either participated or were involved in the illicit conduct. As
such, the way federal authorities investigate sex trafficking can, and should
be, reimagined.
Combining this knowledge with further research into the psychological
effects of saddling victims with the burden of carrying an investigation
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Amanda Gvozden, Curtis French, and Teresa Manning. Finally, thank you to my mother and
expert proof-reader Kathy Binder for catching every redundant phrasing, tense issue, and
missing comma.
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through to conviction, sex trafficking investigators can look to prosecutorial
tactics used by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. Since
1993, the Antitrust Division has operated their Amnesty Program, which
grants immunity to those who either engage in or have knowledge of an
illegal price-fixing scheme, and voluntarily bring this information to the
government. The Division has seen great success with their leniency
program, as over 90% of cases in the Division now begin with an amnesty
cooperator. This Comment proposes that a similar leniency program could
be utilized for investigating sex trafficking. A leniency program recognizes
the three realities listed above: it fits within a reactive process for identifying
cases, it relieves burdens on victims to begin investigations, and it recognizes
that there are many other individuals who could provide information about
illegal trafficking.
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INTRODUCTION
On July 8, 2019, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of
New York announced that it had indicted billionaire financier Jeffrey Epstein
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on one count of sex trafficking and one count of sex trafficking conspiracy.1
The indictment alleged that over the course of four years, from 2002 through
2005, Epstein had “enticed and recruited . . . minor girls to visit his
mansion . . . to engage in sex acts with him, after which he would give the
victims hundreds of dollars in cash.”2 These sex acts typically took the form
of one-off “massages,” which in actuality were sexual abuse.3 Epstein
furthered the scheme by paying his victims to recruit additional minor girls
to abuse.4
The indictment mentioned only the victims,5 three anonymized
employees, and Epstein himself.6 While the conduct detailed in the
indictment was more than sufficient to substantiate the sex trafficking
charges against Epstein, it did not encompass the full range of allegations of
sexual misconduct levied against the disgraced financier. The indictment also
did not indicate all of the persons who may have been involved in the
exploitation, such as other abusers, enablers, and victims. 7 Victims claimed
they were transported around the world as Epstein’s sex slaves, both for him
and his powerful friends, ranging from British monarch Prince Andrew to
United States v. Jeffrey Epstein, 19 Cr. 490 (RMB), U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Sept. 4, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/programs/victim-witness-services/united-states-v-jeffreyepstein-19-cr-490-rmb [https://perma.cc/H2J3-7YTA].
2
Indictment at 1, United States v. Epstein, No. 19-crim-490 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
3
Id. at 3.
4
Id. at 1–2.
5
There is considerable debate about whether those who have had sex crimes inflicted
upon them identify as victims or by another term, such as survivor. See, e.g., Key Terms and
Phrases, RAINN, https://www.rainn.org/articles/key-terms-and-phrases [https://perma.cc/CR
C9-3CTQ]. Those who have undergone such traumas are free and empowered to identify by
any label they see fit, and I do not mean to diminish their voices. However, while prosecutors
and investigators are also aware of the benefits of the term survivor, the term victim is used
by experts in the criminal justice system to describe persons who have been subjected to a
crime. SEXUAL ASSAULT KIT INITIATIVE, VICTIM OR SURVIVOR: TERMINOLOGY FROM
INVESTIGATION THROUGH PROSECUTION 1, https://sakitta.org/toolkit/docs/Victim-or-SurvivorTerminology-from-Investigation-Through-Prosecution.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SNG-G5KG];
Crime Victimization Glossary, OFF. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME (May 18, 2020), https://ovc.ojp
.gov/library/crime-victimization-glossary [https://perma.cc/22SK-SGES]. Therefore, for
purposes of clarity, I will identify those who were trafficked as victims throughout this
Comment.
6
See Indictment, supra note 2, at 1–6.
7
See, e.g., Jeffrey Epstein: Filthy Rich: The Island (Netflix May 27, 2020) (containing
interview with Epstein victim Sarah Ransome, in which she describes being held on Epstein’s
private Caribbean island as a sex slave); Julie K. Brown, New Jeffrey Epstein Accuser Goes
Public; Defamation Lawsuit Targets Dershowitz, MIA. HERALD (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.
miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/article229277874.html (reporting on lawsuit by Maria
Farmer alleging that Epstein sexually assaulted her sister in 1996).
1
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former United States senator George Mitchell.8 Epstein allegedly “loaned”
girls to prominent American politicians, foreign presidents, and business
executives,9 and would film the sex acts on his properties for possible
blackmail.10 While none of these allegations served as the basis for criminal
charges, the allegations revealed a world of illicit sex trafficking much wider
than that alleged in the July 8, 2019 indictment.11
Epstein’s case illustrates two realities about investigating sex
trafficking: (1) sex trafficking schemes and organizations are frequently
much more complex than just a trafficker and victim(s), yet (2) even with
this complexity, sex trafficking cases are centered around victims testifying
against their traffickers. While the nuances of Epstein’s schemes may have
been specific to him, the level of complexity of his conduct was not unique.
In South Dakota, prosecutors convicted a doctor of giving fraudulent
Oxycontin prescriptions to minor victims in exchange for sex, even though
he knew they were being trafficked.12 In southern California, street level
traffickers earned cash by selling commercial sex acts with trafficked women
and moved that cash all around the world through “mules” who hid the cash
in objects such as clothing or toys.13
These examples only capture a sliver of the diversity of trafficking
schemes currently operating today. While the methods of each scheme differ,
See Adam Withnall, Teenage ‘Sex Slave’ Virginia Roberts Claims She Was Paid £10,000
by Jeffrey Epstein to Have Sex with Prince Andrew, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 4, 2015, 3:33 PM),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/teenage-sex-slave-virginia-roberts-claims-shewas-paid-ps10-000-jeffrey-epstein-have-sex-prince-andrew-london-home-9956338.html
[https://perma.cc/4VZ5-RCTQ]; Jane Musgrave, John Pacenti & Lulu Ramadan, Jeffrey
Epstein Victim: He Farmed Me Out to Ex-Senator, Governor for Sex, PALM BEACH POST (Aug.
9, 2019), https://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/20190809/jeffrey-epstein-victim-he-farmedme-out-to-ex-senator-governor-for-sex [https://perma.cc/LK7W-9G4U].
9
Paul Lewis, Jeffrey Epstein: The Rise and Fall of Teacher Turned Tycoon, GUARDIAN
(Jan. 4, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jan/02/jeffrey-epstein-rise-andfall-of-teacher-turned-tycoon [https://perma.cc/EZ7N-SZHS].
10
Pooja Bhagat, Prince Andrew Might Have Been Caught On Tape With ‘Sex Slave’,
INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2015), https://www.ibtimes.com.au/prince-andrew-might-havebeen-caught-tape-sex-slave-1407641 [https://perma.cc/CR8Z-RLSC].
11
See Indictment, supra note 2, at 8–12.
12
NAT’L HUM. TRAFFICKING RES. CTR., TEN YEARS OF SEX TRAFFICKING CASES IN THE
UNITED STATES 4, https://humantraffickinghotline.org/sites/default/files/Sex%20Trafficking
%20Prosecutions%20in%20the%20US%202006-2015%20-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/KS
A9-3F7R]; Factual Basis Statement at 1, United States v. Payer, No. 10-cr-40081 (S.D. 2010).
13
Opal Singleton, International Sex Trafficking and Money Laundering Rings in Southern
California, USC SAFE COMTYS. INST. (Aug. 10, 2020), https://sci.usc.edu/2020/08/10/
international-sex-trafficking-and-money-laundering-rings-in-southern-california/
[https://perma.cc/9K8F-P9AL].
8

2022]

GETTING OUT OF TRAFFIC

635

they are all secretive and involve many individuals other than the victim and
the lead trafficker. The secretiveness of sex trafficking stymies investigative
efforts, as detecting such schemes is incredibly difficult.14 However, because
these schemes are wide in scope, due to the sheer number of people involved,
many individuals have knowledge about them and are simply not coming
forward to investigators with that knowledge.15
When investigating sex trafficking, investigators do not seem to
acknowledge either of these realities. Instead of using proactive measures to
detect sex trafficking rings, over half of all sex trafficking cases begin by a
third-party tip to law enforcement.16 Further, the law that sex traffickers are
prosecuted under, the Trafficking Victim’s Protection Act, puts victims at the
center of investigations.17 As a result, investigators become fixated on
charging traffickers based on victim testimony at the expense of pursuing
investigative avenues involving others in the trafficking scheme. 18 This
strategy puts a great burden on the victim to provide enough evidence to
convict her trafficker (assuming she is willing to participate) while ignoring
other key sources of information and testimony.19

14

AMY FARRELL, JACK MCDEVITT, REBECCA PFEFFER, STEPHANIE FAHY, COLLEEN
OWENS, MEREDITH DANK & WILLIAM ADAMS., URBAN INST. JUST. POL’Y CTR., IDENTIFYING
CHALLENGES TO IMPROVE THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF STATE AND LOCAL HUMAN
TRAFFICKING CASES 75 (2012), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/25526/
412593-Identifying-Challenges-to-Improve-the-Investigation-and-Prosecution-of-State-andLocal-Human-Trafficking-Cases.PDF [https://perma.cc/NY5X-3MPZ].
15
See Jennifer A. L. Sheldon-Sherman, The Missing “P”: Prosecution, Prevention,
Protection, and Partnership in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 117 PENN ST. L. REV.
443, 473 (2012) (noting the widespread nature of many trafficking rings); FARRELL,
MCDEVITT, PFEFFER, FAHY, OWENS, DANK & ADAMS, supra note 14, at 42 (finding that only
3% of all cases begin through a confidential informant aware of possible sex trafficking).
16
FARRELL, MCDEVITT, PFEFFER, FAHY, OWENS, DANK & ADAMS, supra note 14, at 39–
40.
17
See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (requiring prosecutors to prove that traffickers used “force,
threats of force, fraud, [or] coercion . . . to cause the [victim] to engage in a commercial sex
act”).
18
FARRELL, MCDEVITT, PFEFFER, FAHY, OWENS, DANK & ADAMS, supra note 14, at 201–
02.
19
Throughout this Comment, I will be identifying victims as female and traffickers as
male, as victims and traffickers are most likely to be female and male, respectively. See id. at
56–57. However, while women make up the majority of victims, men and boys are certainly
trafficked as well. See DUREN BANKS & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CHARACTERISTICS OF SUSPECTED HUMAN TRAFFICKING INCIDENTS, 2008–
2010, at 6 (2011). Women are also frequently involved as traffickers as well. See Singleton,
supra note 13. However, for clarity I will refer to victims as women and traffickers as men
throughout this Comment.
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While worlds apart, antitrust prosecutions offer a useful alternative
model for pursuing sex trafficking organizations. The federal government’s
antitrust enforcement powers focus on schemes, called “cartels,” between
market competitors (for example, Virgin Atlantic versus British Airways20)
to fix prices, rig bids, or artificially manipulate the market for their own
financial gain.21 Like sex trafficking, these crimes are highly complex, as
they involve coordination between multiple participating parties, and are
highly secretive.22 Cartel work is known to and facilitated by multiple people
all sharing the same incentive to stay silent.23 Cartel and sex trafficking
investigators primarily rely on tips and self-reporting from those with
knowledge of the criminal activity. Neither focus on proactive methods of
detection.24
Recognizing that antitrust crimes are difficult to detect but involve
many persons that can serve as possible witnesses or sources of evidence, the
Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division created a leniency program for
cartel participants to come forward to alert government authorities about
ongoing antitrust conspiracies.25 Anyone with knowledge of or who
participated in a cartel can bring evidence to the government in exchange for

20

Press Release, Department of Justice, British Airways PLC and Korean Air Lines Co.
Ltd. Agree to Plead Guilty and Pay Criminal Fines Totaling $600 Million For Fixing Prices
on Passenger and Cargo Flights (Aug. 1, 2007), https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/
press_releases/2007/224928.htm [https://perma.cc/WL8Y-HUQ6].
21
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2. See also The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws
[https://perma.cc/VMN8-YLD8].
22
Sandra Marco Colino, The Perks of Being a Whistleblower: Designing Efficient
Leniency Programs in New Antitrust Jurisdictions, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 535, 538
(2017).
23
Stephen A. Fraser, Placing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on the Tracks in the Race
for Amnesty, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1009, 1018 (2012).
24
See, e.g., FARRELL, MCDEVITT, PFEFFER, FAHY, OWENS, DANK & ADAMS, supra note
14, at 77, 80 (discussing investigators reliance on reactive case identification methods); Scott
D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. for Crim. Enf’t, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
The Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement Over the Last Two Decades, Presented at
the 24th Annual National Institute on White Collar Crime 3 (Feb. 25, 2010),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518241/download [https://perma.cc/FYU3-W8G3] [hereinafter Hammond, Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement] (noting that over 90% of cases
prosecuted by the Antitrust Division originate from leniency program participants).
25
ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY (1993),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/810281/download [https://perma.cc/9QKP-FESR] [hereinafter CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY].
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complete immunity from criminal charges.26 From the government’s
perspective, leniency allows investigators to learn about criminal cartels they
otherwise would have no idea existed.27 For cartel members, it allows
companies and individuals to report wrongdoing without the fear of exposing
themselves to charges.28 Since its inception, the leniency program has been a
resounding success, as over 90% of criminal antitrust investigations involve
a leniency applicant.29
Given the similarities between sex trafficking and antitrust crimes, this
Comment proposes that a Department of Justice, Antitrust Division-style
leniency program should be adopted for sex trafficking investigations. Like
antitrust crimes, authorities have difficulty identifying sex trafficking and
those with a desire to come forward may be reluctant to expose themselves
to charges. Therefore, a leniency program for sex trafficking prosecutions
demonstrates potential for identifying cases that would otherwise go
undetected. Thus, this Comment will show how sex trafficking investigations
would benefit from such a program. Part I scrutinizes how sex trafficking
rings operate and how they are currently prosecuted. Part II examines the
wider scope of sex trafficking, departing from the traditional model
employed by prosecutors and investigators. Part III explores how such cases
are investigated and identifies the many actors who could qualify for
immunity for their testimony and details the creation and success of the
Antitrust Division’s Amnesty Program. Part IV argues that because of their
similarities and the remarkable success of the program for the Antitrust
Division, offices investigating sex trafficking should implement their own
version of the Amnesty Program.

26
Colino, supra note 22, at 543. There are other provisions limiting who is eligible for
leniency, such as the company or individual must be the first in the scheme to cooperate. See
infra Section III.B.
27
See Scott D. Hammond, Dir. Of Crim. Enf’t, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
Detecting and Deterring Cartel Activity Through an Effective Leniency Program, Presented
at the International Workshop on Cartels 4 (Nov. 21, 2000), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/
518521/download [https://perma.cc/9NQG-ZMT5] [hereinafter Hammond, Detecting and
Deterring].
28
Gary R. Spratling, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
Corporate Leniency Policy: Answers to Recurring Questions, Presented at the ABA Antitrust
Section 1998 Spring Meeting 1 (April 1, 1998), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/519531/
download [https://perma.cc/77GM-SBS2] [hereinafter Spratling, Corporate Leniency Policy].
29
Hammond, Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 24, at 3.
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I. SEX TRAFFICKING INVESTIGATIONS
This Part will explore sex trafficking and how it is investigated and
prosecuted. Part I is divided into three sections exploring both how sex
trafficking currently operates in the United States and how authorities
investigate and prosecute offenders. The first section will detail the
traditional three-part model that investigators rely on in defining sex
trafficking. Next, the Comment will analyze developments in federal statutes
addressing sex trafficking. Finally, within this legal framework, the final
section examines the ways in which sex trafficking investigations originate.
A. THE NATURE OF SEX TRAFFICKING

In the early 20th century, organized prostitution and sex trafficking
frequently took place at a central location, most commonly called a brothel.30
However, the enterprise, and the involved criminal activity, has modernized,
increasing its complexity and secretiveness. Through technological
development and greater avoidance of law enforcement, sex trafficking takes
place at various locations through various forms.31 Common to all locations
is their secretiveness. Traffickers go to great lengths to keep their victims out
of sight of those likely to take notice and alert authorities.32 This
secretiveness both furthers the enterprise and makes detection even more
difficult.33
In the traditional framework of trafficking schemes, sex trafficking
consists of three types of actors: the traffickers, the victims, and the clients.34
Under this traditional model, the trafficker is the organizer or operator of the
30
1 HOWARD B. WOOLSTON, PROSTITUTION IN THE UNITED STATES: PRIOR TO THE
ENTRANCE OF THE UNITED STATES INTO THE WORLD WAR 38–39 (1921).
31
Victims may be delivered to those purchasing illicit sex acts, with over 40% of sex
trafficking cases involving victims meeting clients at the client’s residence. FARRELL,
MCDEVITT, PFEFFER, FAHY, OWENS, DANK & ADAMS, supra note 14, at 40. Some traffickers
also have roving meeting spots, while others keep victims at one location. Jennifer Gentile
Long, Enhancing Prosecutions of Human Trafficking and Related Violence Against Sexually
Exploited Women, STRATEGIES: THE PROSECUTORS’ NEWSL. ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN,
(Aequitas), May 2012, at 3–4. Other common locations take place at lawful businesses,
including hotels and motels, massage parlors, or through an escort service. FARRELL,
MCDEVITT, PFEFFER, FAHY, OWENS, DANK & ADAMS, supra note 14, at 40–41.
32
FARRELL, MCDEVITT, PFEFFER, FAHY, OWENS, DANK & ADAMS, supra note 14, at 75.
33
As discussed more fully infra at Part I.C, sex trafficking cases begin not from detection
by investigators, but rather by an individual reporting possible illicit activity. See id. at 39–40.
To maintain secrecy, investigators lament that traffickers change their methods constantly,
and operate during business hours to avoid detection. Id. at 75.
34
See Stephen C. Parker & Jonathan T. Skrmetti, Pimps Down: A Prosecutorial
Perspective on Domestic Sex Trafficking, 43 U. MEM. L. REV. 1013, 1019–30 (2013).
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trafficking ring and plays an active role in the control over their victims. 35
While any person who aids or abets a sex trafficking scheme could be
considered a perpetrator, under the traditional model, the individual who
exerts force over the victims and leads the trafficking ring is considered the
perpetrator.36 Traffickers gain control over victims by establishing their
subservience through many means, ranging from cultivating a false romantic
relationship to physical violence.37 While the techniques may vary, the
trafficker is the primary criminal facilitator. Without the trafficker, the
trafficking would not exist.
The second group in the traditional model are victims. Victims are
defined as persons subjected to sex trafficking.38 More specifically, women
or girls who are transported or recruited under the duress of force or coercion
for the purpose of exploitation are victims of trafficking. 39 Victims are
controlled by their traffickers and forced to engage in commercial sex acts,
while seeing little to none of the profit.40 These commercial sex acts
encompass more than just prostitution. Victims can be forced to take part in
stripping, mail-order marriages, and pornography.41 There is no single way
that one becomes a victim, as traffickers rely on several methods to identify

35

Id. at 1023.
See id. at 1023–24. See also Michelle Jeffs, Punishing Pimps and Johns: Sex Trafficking
and Utah’s Laws, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 219, 224–26 (2013).
37
Traffickers rely on a number of different means of control, including psychological
coercion, separation from friends or loved ones, or physical violence. Jeffs, supra note 36, at
225; Sarah Crocker, Note, Stripping Agency from Top to Bottom: The Need for a Sentencing
Guideline Safety Valve for Bottoms Prosecuted Under the Federal Sex Trafficking Statutes,
111 NW. U. L. REV. 753, 761 (2017). Pimps will commonly “groom” victims, in a process
where they identify young girls who are likely to have experienced trauma and neglect. See
Parker & Skrmetti, supra note 34, at 1025–27. The pimp will falsely cultivate feelings of love
and security with the victim, creating a sense of loyalty by the victim toward her trafficker. Id.
at 1025. Other traffickers offer false promises of a better life in a foreign country, enticing
women from developing nations with job opportunities in a wealthier country, only to force
them into sex work. See Donna M. Hughes, Combating Sex Trafficking: A PerpetratorFocused Approach, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 28, 51 (2008). Some traffickers will place an
artificial debt (called a “debt bondage”) upon victims that they must pay off before they are
given their agency and autonomy back, and even then they are still under the trafficker’s
control. See Sheldon-Sherman, supra note 15, at 448.
38
Jeffs, supra note 36, at 222.
39
See, e.g., FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, FINANCIAL FLOWS FROM HUMAN
TRAFFICKING 25–26 (2018), https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/content/images/humantrafficking-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BK8-XZWW] [hereinafter FATF REPORT].
40
See Hughes, supra note 37, at 51; Parker & Skrmetti, supra note 34, at 1018.
41
Sheldon-Sherman, supra note 15, at 448.
36
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and recruit women and girls.42 However, all victims possess some
vulnerability, whether financial, emotional, or psychological.43 Traffickers
recognize these vulnerabilities and take advantage of them.44
The final group in the traditional framework are the clients, commonly
referred to as “johns.” They provide the demand that allows sex trafficking
schemes to thrive.45 Johns can be matched with victims in a number of ways
including through the internet, escort services, or direct contact with the
trafficker.46 Johns may or may not be aware that victims are being trafficked
and may believe that they are engaged with women who are willing sex
workers.47
While this tripartite structure is factually true in many circumstances,48
it is unduly limiting, as evidenced by the conduct of Jeffrey Epstein and other
notable examples.49 Pimps, victims, and johns are by no means the only
actors involved in sex trafficking. Examples such as Epstein show that
schemes can operate amongst the world’s financial and political elites
involving many more people than just the categories in the traditional
approach. They can also operate among street gangs due in part to the
lucrative nature of sex trafficking and the low risk of detection.50 Others build
42

Recent examples include traffickers posing as modeling agencies, United States v.
Flanders, 752 F.3d 1317, 1326 (11th Cir. 2014), recruitment through internet chat rooms,
United States v. Chappell, 779 F.3d 872, 874 (8th Cir. 2015), or advertising job opportunities
in the U.S., State v. Vass, No. 14-22076B (Fla. Miami-Dade County Ct. Nov. 15, 2015). See
NAT’L HUM. TRAFFICKING RES. CTR., supra note 12, at 3–5.
43
See Crocker, supra note 37, at 767.
44
Parker & Skrmetti, supra note 34, at 1017.
45
Jeffs, supra note 36, at 224.
46
FARRELL, MCDEVITT, PFEFFER, FAHY, OWENS, DANK & ADAMS, supra note 14, at 76–
77, 152; Long, supra note 31, at 3–4.
47
Jeffs, supra note 36, at 224.
48
See id. at 226; Parker & Skrmetti, supra note 34, at 1018.
49
Another high-profile sex trafficking case was the NXIVM sex cult, popularized by the
HBO docuseries The Vow. Dan Reilly, What to Know About HBO’s The Vow and the NXIVM
Sex Cult, VULTURE (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.vulture.com/article/the-vow-nxivm-cultwhat-to-know.html [https://perma.cc/8KFA-QJ9N]. Branded as providing self-improvement
services, the company operated as an underground sex cult, leading to the conviction of six
individuals on charges related to sex trafficking. Vanessa Grigoriadis, Inside Nxivm, the ‘Sex
Cult’ That Preached Empowerment, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/05/30/magazine/sex-cult-empowerment-nxivm-keith-raniere.html
[https://perma.cc/
745N-DUU8]; Andrew R. Chow, NXIVM Leader Keith Raniere Has Been Convicted for
Keeping Women as ‘Sex Slaves.’ Here Are the Major Players in the Case, TIME (June 19,
2019, 5:24 PM), https://time.com/5568135/nxivm-allison-mack-raniere/ [https://perma.cc/
R2HT-35LB].
50
Long, supra note 31, at 5–6.
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industries around sex trafficking by operating lawful businesses, such as strip
clubs, pornography production companies, or massage parlors, and traffic
victims through those businesses.51 With the many forms of sex trafficking
comes massive profits. The value of the global trade of persons for
commercial sex practices ranges from lower estimates around $7–12 billion52
to upwards of $99 billion a year.53 On a smaller scale, a trafficker can make
between $4,000 and $50,000 per victim.54
B. THE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION ACT OF 2000 AND
THE “VICTIM-CENTERED” APPROACH

Today, sex trafficking is prosecuted under the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA).55 Recognizing the lack of comprehensive
modern anti-sex trafficking legislation,56 the TVPA punishes anyone who
“recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, . . . [or]
maintains . . . by any means a person” or “benefits, financially or by
receiving anything of value, from participation” in the sex trafficking
scheme.57 To be found guilty of sex trafficking under the TVPA, the
government must prove: (1) the defendant acted in furtherance of or benefit
from a commercial sex act, (2) the defendant knew or recklessly disregarded
that force, fraud, or coercion would cause the victim to engage in a

51

Sheldon-Sherman, supra note 15, at 448; Hughes, supra note 37, at 28, 35.
Donna M. Hughes, The “Natasha” Trade: The Transnational Shadow Market of
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FATF REPORT, supra note 39, at 13.
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Jeffs, supra note 36, at 219 (quoting Human Trafficking’s Dirty Profits and Huge Costs,
INTER-AMERICAN DEV. BANK (Nov. 2, 2006), https://www.iadb.org/en/news/humantraffickings-dirty-profits-and-huge-costs [https://perma.cc/7XUK-MDTD]).
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18 U.S.C. § 1591; Parker & Skrmetti, supra note 34, at 1030.
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Prior to the TVPA’s passage, federal prosecutors relied on a patchwork of different
statutes, none of which were specifically written to combat sex trafficking. See Crocker, supra
note 37, at 757–58. Such statutes included post-Civil War anti-slavery and involuntary
servitude laws, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581–84, and the Mann Act of 1910, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1421–24,
which criminalized transporting individuals in furtherance of prostitution. See also SheldonSherman, supra note 15, at 451. However, because these laws attempted to solve different
problems in much earlier time periods, they were too limited to reflect the nuance of modern
sex trafficking. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581–84 (outlining criminal penalties for involuntary
servitude only recognizing physical coercion). The TVPA was passed specifically to combat
human trafficking, instead of continuing to wedge sex trafficking prosecution and prevention
into an existing law. See 22 U.S.C. § 7101.
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18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2).
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commercial sex act or that the victim was under 18 years of age, and (3) the
activity was in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.58
The criminal sanctions are only one subset of the TVPA’s legislative
goals. The law’s central purposes have been called the “three P’s”: punish
traffickers, prevent trafficking (internationally and domestically), and
provide services to victims.59 The three P’s lay out the ultimate aim of the
TVPA: to eradicate sex trafficking and ensure victims are identified and
assisted.60 In addition to the criminal sanctions, the law focuses more widely
on the welfare of victims, providing funding for services such as
psychological counseling, housing, and legal services.61
The TVPA notably adopts a “victim-centered” approach. Investigators
and humanitarians concentrate on uncovering sex trafficking rings to save
victims from further abuse.62 Once victims are no longer under the control of
their traffickers, the TVPA provides victims with financial assistance and
emotional services to help them overcome their trauma.63 The victimcentered approach extends to prosecution of traffickers, as cases are centered
on victim testimony.64
The key element to convict a perpetrator of sex trafficking is the
requirement that the victim was under the “threat[] of force, fraud, [or]
coercion.”65 A victim can single-handedly prove this element, as she is the
person best positioned to testify about physical harm inflicted upon her or
about how she was coerced or defrauded under the TVPA.66 It is nearly
impossible to bring a successful case under the TVPA without victim
testimony.67 In addition to satisfying the duress elements of the TVPA,
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Id.; see also Parker & Skrmetti, supra note 34, at 1032.
22 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (“The purposes of this chapter are to combat trafficking in
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victims.”).
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227, 247 (2015).
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Hughes, supra note 37, at 37.
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Sheldon-Sherman, supra note 15, at 456.
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Hughes, supra note 37, at 38.
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18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2).
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Terry Coonan, Anatomy of a Sex Trafficking Case, 5 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV.
313, 341 (2010).
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Hughes, supra note 37, at 37; Coonan, supra note 66, at 341. Commenting on the
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victims also shed light on other aspects of their trafficking, leading to
additional evidence. A victim can identify her perpetrators across the
organization’s hierarchy, ranging from those in charge of recruiting new
prostitutes to the head of the ring.68 She can provide phone numbers of those
involved. She can identify locations in which she met clients and how they
were paid. At trial, a victim can offer a compelling narrative for a jury to
sympathize with, which increases the likelihood of conviction.69 Given the
breadth of information that a victim can provide, it is clear why investigators
train their focus on them to build cases against traffickers.
However, centering cases around victim cooperation has complex
consequences, both for the investigators and for the victims themselves.
Before a victim can begin contributing to the criminal investigation against
her trafficker, investigators spend a great deal of time and effort determining
whether that individual should even be considered a victim,70 asking whether
the individual willingly took part in sex work or is a perpetrator furthering
the scheme.71 To be considered a victim under the TVPA, she must either (1)
be a minor or (2) have been under the duress of force, fraud, or coercion.72 If
she is a victim, investigators further assess whether she moved up the ranks
within the sex trafficking ring to become a “bottom,” (i.e., someone with
more responsibility in recruiting and overseeing the forced prostitution of
other victims).73 The decision whether to see someone as a bottom or as a
victim determines whether the individual becomes the star witness in
building a sex trafficking case or one of the prosecution’s targets.74 Reaching
this determination can take weeks as prosecutors interview an individual to
comprehend the full extent of her story.75
68

Sheldon-Sherman, supra note 15, at 476.
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Crocker, supra note 37, at 773.
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Crocker, supra note 37, at 771–73.
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Hughes, supra note 37, at 37; Crocker, supra note 37, at 775–76.
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charged by prosecutors. See, e.g., Crocker, supra note 37, at 778; Criminal Complaint, United
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Memorandum, United States v. Campbell, No. 1:10-cr-00026 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2012)
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Even if investigators determine that the identified individual is a victim
of sex trafficking and can potentially become the prosecution’s key witness,
the feeling may not be mutual. Many victims may believe they have done
something wrong and are afraid they will be prosecuted.76 Even if the victim
understands that she was victimized, she may be unwilling to cooperate with
the investigation for any number of other reasons—for example, she may not
trust the government to keep her safe or obtain justice in her case.77 She may
feel that she has no alternatives besides the life provided by her trafficker,78
or may feel a sense of love and loyalty towards her trafficker.79 Or she may
be fearful of repercussions by her perpetrator and determine it is safer not to
say anything that could make her situation worse than it already is.80 These
issues are exacerbated for victims trafficked from other countries where
obstacles such as a language barrier or unfamiliarity with government
services prevent victims from cooperating.81
Even if a victim overcomes these obstacles and initially cooperates with
investigators, the protracted process of building and prosecuting a case can
become too much for a victim to handle.82 Cooperation with investigators can
take years, requiring victims to recount their trauma dozens of times through
investigation and trial.83 Because trauma affects everyone differently, the
victim may have trouble remembering details of her abuse undermining her
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IN PERSONS REPORT 23 (2004), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/
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ability to aid investigators and withstand cross-examination (should the case
go to trial).84
These issues are only exacerbated if a victim does not cooperate or
decides midway through the investigation to stop cooperating. Prosecutors
will go to great lengths to ensure victims’ testimony because of how central
they are to the government’s case.85 And because victims engaged in illegal
sex work (even against their will), prosecutors possess ever-present leverage
over victims and are able to charge them at any time.86 Prosecutors will either
charge or threaten to charge the victim with a crime to ensure she testifies
against her trafficker.87 Where the victim is a minor, prosecutors sometimes
charge them with a misdemeanor offense to hold them in a state facility
thereby separating and protecting them from their traffickers to ensure their
testimony.88 These tactics, while useful for the prosecutor’s case, only make
the victim’s recovery that much harder. Because the government is
threatening them with a criminal record, victims can feel re-victimized as
they are still expected to be subservient to a more powerful actor or face harsh
consequences.89 In the effort to convict a trafficker, the victim of the
trafficking becomes victim to the might of the prosecutor and the stigma of a
criminal record.90
The reliance on victims also goes against the entire purpose of the
TVPA: to ensure and protect the welfare of victims. Placing the responsibility
of successful prosecution on the victim’s testimony is a heavy burden that
many may not be equipped to emotionally handle.91 At the very least, such
an experience is mentally and emotionally taxing and does not further the
TVPA’s stated purpose to benefit the victim as she moves past her
experiences with trafficking.92 It is counterintuitive to simultaneously
promote a law to help victims overcome their trafficking experiences while
also requiring them to relive the horrors of those experiences time and again
throughout the investigative process. While we cannot expect to prosecute
every sex trafficking case without any victim testimony, investigators can
84
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rely on other avenues of evidence-gathering to lessen the evidentiary burden
placed upon the victim.93 As this Comment argues in greater depth in Part
IV, implementing a program that incentivizes perpetrators to come forward
with evidence of sex trafficking would go great lengths toward easing that
burden off victims.
C. HOW SEX TRAFFICKING INVESTIGATIONS BEGIN

Though Congress sought to stop sex trafficking and protect victims
through the TVPA, they did not include proactive detection techniques and
strategies in their reform.94 To identify sex trafficking cases, prosecutors
overwhelmingly adopt a reactive approach, waiting for law enforcement
authorities to bring cases to them instead of devoting resources to detecting
these cases themselves.95 This approach is evident in the investigative
statistics, with 37% of all sex trafficking cases beginning as a tip from a thirdparty to law enforcement.96 Additionally, 18% of new cases are identified
during the course of existing sex trafficking investigations.97 Conversely,
only 10% of all cases began with a victim self-reporting to police.98
By comparison, sex trafficking violations detected by proactive
investigative measures only make up a fraction of documented cases,
93
See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 37, at 37–38 (arguing to refocus trafficking investigations
to center on perpetrators instead of victims); Human Trafficking Fraud Enforcement Act of
2015, H.R. 1311, 114th Cong. (2015) (proposing new criminal enhancements for tax evasion
in furtherance of sex trafficking).
94
See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386,
114 Stat. 1465 (2000). While the TVPA is notable for its expansion of sex trafficking penalties
and its focus on the welfare of victims after they have been removed from their traffickers’
grasp, see Crocker, supra note 37, at 759, Congress did not create any new methods of
detection, nor did they empower agencies to rely on proactive detection methods.
95
FARRELL, MCDEVITT, PFEFFER, FAHY, OWENS, DANK & ADAMS, supra note 14, at 196.
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prostitute they had illegally engaged with was possibly being trafficked. What makes it
surprising is also what limits the number of tips: the john is engaging in an illegal activity.
Because prostitution is widely illegal, a john opens himself up to criminal liability in order to
report his suspicion of sex trafficking. Even though some are willing to eschew their own selfinterest and report possible trafficking, many others are likely deterred from reporting possible
trafficking because of the illegality of prostitution.
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Id. at 42. Because many of the cases that were discovered through ongoing
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comprising about 12% of sex trafficking cases.99 These totals confirm that
investigators are not discovering their cases through proactive detection, and
that prosecutors are mostly at the whim of good Samaritans reporting
suspected illicit conduct. The reliance on third-party reporting also illustrates
the problems of building cases around victim cooperation and testimony.
Even if a victim self-reports, she is still saddled with the difficulties of
cooperating throughout the entire investigative process.100 Yet the vast
majority of victims do not voluntarily come forward—they are discovered
through other means.101 As a result, victims need to be convinced from the
outset to participate in what could be a years-long investigation, which can
breed skepticism, contempt, or unreliability on the part of the victim.
This data shows that neither perpetrators nor victims come forward to
investigators to report trafficking, as there is little incentive to do so. Unless
investigators are willing to exponentially increase proactive detection efforts,
the incentives for reporting illegal activity need to change. The secretive
nature of sex trafficking is an impediment to adequate detection, as there are
only so many third-party observers who are willing to report suspicious
activity. Because of this, if Congress wants to effectuate its purpose of
eradicating sex trafficking, it needs to create further avenues to increase
detection.
II. THE WIDER SCOPE OF SEX TRAFFICKING
Any criminal organization, especially one with an international reach,
involves more people than the trafficker, the john, and the victim. Everyone
involved in the ring ensures its success and prevents detection. Individuals
managing the finances of a trafficking organization, hotel employees,
internet domain providers, or bank employees all have relevant information.
Each may face criminal liability for their role in facilitating illegal sex
trafficking. However, it is difficult for prosecutors to charge them under the
TVPA, as such individuals may not have the required intent or knowledge of
the trafficking, or because prosecutors cannot prove that they engaged in, or
conspired in, the requisite fraud, force, or coercion.102 However, these
99

Id. at 40. Examples of proactive measures include sting operations, intelligence
development on local criminal activities, or standardization of questionnaires for service
provider interviews of runaway children. Id. at 42, 73, 79.
100
See supra Part I.B.
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individuals are not immune from criminal prosecution, and they know it.
While they may not be charged under the TVPA, many other charges could
be brought against persons who are involved in some capacity including
money laundering, visa fraud, and illegally facilitating sex trafficking online,
among many others.103
As this Comment discusses in Part IV, all of these people have
information about the sex trafficking organization that would be valuable to
investigators. However, because of their vulnerability to criminal charges
(real or imagined), these individuals are unlikely to come forward to
cooperate with investigators.
The following subsections examine other individuals potentially
involved in facilitating or allowing the sex trafficking organizations to
covertly operate. By understanding the organization’s ancillary actors and
their criminal vulnerability, we can better understand who can become
potential cooperators and why they are currently unwilling to come forward
to alert investigators of illicit conduct.
A. THOSE INVOLVED IN FINANCIAL CRIME

As victims are trafficked across the world, the money follows. Any
person who earns money through illicit means and transfers it through
legitimate channels such as bank accounts or investments opens themselves
up to charges of money laundering.104 Individuals can engage in money
laundering in many ways. Ill-gotten funds can be used to further the criminal
enterprise, including purchasing plane tickets to transport victims or hotel
rooms for buyers.105 Proceeds can be used for bribery, including but not
limited to public officials, to ensure secrecy.106 Money can be stored in an
offshore account in a country with strong bank privacy laws, such as the
Cayman Islands.107 Offenders will also try to funnel illegal funds through
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facially legal means, such as businesses (including the businesses that traffic
women, such as strip clubs) or real estate.108
Money laundering is still seen as the “Achilles heel” of international
criminal organizations.109 When money moves through established financial
systems, such as through banks or regulated exchanges, it produces a
documented history of those transactions.110 For example, in a Southern
California large-scale trafficking ring, investigators were able to identify fifty
bank accounts in nine different banks containing proceeds from sex
trafficking, which was used to buy real estate in the surrounding area.111
When that much money, all derived through illicit means, is transported
through multiple channels, many individuals may have knowledge about its
source or have participated in the laundering. Examples of persons involved
or having knowledge about trafficking schemes include those who manage
the ring’s finances, including bookkeepers, accountants, or financial
advisors. Bank employees may also be valuables sources of information, as
they may come to learn about the source of illicit funds and may not
immediately report their customer. Many who facilitate money laundering
may do so unwittingly, only learning the truth later, and do not actually face
criminal charges. Yet because they unintentionally find themselves involved,
they may fear investigators believe they were involved in the trafficking
organization all along. It is this fear that incentivizes further silence, which
allows the trafficking to continue to go undetected.
Those who are engaged in money laundering are frequently vulnerable
to other financial crimes, including tax fraud and Bank Secrecy Act (BSA)
violations.112 Because funds generated through trafficking are obtained
illicitly, perpetrators are unlikely to include them on tax returns, which leaves
them vulnerable to tax fraud.113 Traffickers may expose themselves to tax
fraud charges by stealing victims’ identities, filing false tax returns, or seizing
fraudulent tax refunds, among other tactics.114 Those who store funds in
108
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110
DEP’T OF STATE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING REPORT, supra note 106, at 1–2.
111
Singleton, supra note 13.
112
Peter E. Meltzer, Keeping Drug Money from Reaching the Wash Cycle: A Guide to the
Bank Secrecy Act, 108 BANKING L.J. 230, 230–31 (1991).
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(2019),
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offshore accounts are likely not reporting the existence of those accounts to
the U.S. Treasury Department.115 It is a criminal violation to willingly and
knowingly fail to file reports of foreign bank and financial accounts.116 Any
individual who assists traffickers in tax preparation may have knowledge of
either the tax crimes or underlying crimes or may have participated
themselves.
The banks, and people who work for them, that operate accounts for
traffickers can also be exposed to criminal liability. Under the BSA, financial
institutions are required to report suspicious financial activity to the federal
government.117 If the institution willingly fails to comply with these
requirements, then they may face criminal penalties.118 As multinational
institutions, banks employ many people who (unwittingly) interact with
traffickers.119 Employees may suspect illegal activity but are not certain
enough to flag such transactions. If they later come to learn that money was
being illegally transferred and it went undetected, employees, or the bank
itself, may be reticent to then blow the whistle and comply with their
obligations under the BSA because doing so might alert authorities to
indifference or an unwillingness to comply with the law earlier.120 While this
would not definitively lead to charges for the bank or employees, the
hesitation to report prevents investigators from gaining another entry point
into a sex trafficking ring.
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B. THOSE INVOLVED IN VISA AND PASSPORT FRAUD

An essential facet of the operation of sex trafficking organizations is the
transportation of victims, both domestically and internationally.121 When
transporting victims, perpetrators frequently violate criminal statutes related
to immigration.122 Passport and visa fraud are common when illicitly
transporting persons across borders.123 Traffickers may work with document
forgers to create false documentation for victims, such as visas or
passports.124 Those who assist the trafficker may later become aware that they
are facilitating sex trafficking. They could offer insight to investigators but
may be reluctant to do so because of their vulnerability for visa or passport
fraud charges.125
For wealthier traffickers, such as Jeffrey Epstein, victims may travel
with their perpetrators on privately chartered planes.126 To avoid detection,
perpetrators may direct the flight company not to reflect the victim’s presence
on the flight manifest. In Epstein’s case, he frequently transported women
and underaged girls to his private island in the U.S. Virgin Islands by way of
his private plane, which frequently did not comply with laws requiring all
visitors to possess either a U.S. passport or a raised-seal birth certificate and
valid U.S. identification.127 Any individual who helps facilitate any form of
visa fraud may be criminally liable, including forgers of official documents
and pilots or employees of the chartered plane company.
C. INTERNET PROVIDERS

Traffickers commonly use the internet to conduct business with
johns.128 These transactions regularly take place on websites tailored for

121
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transactional sex work, which operate within a gray area of legality.129 There
exist open questions about whether a website faces criminal liability when its
users connect for illegal purposes. For example, the website Backpage.com
(Backpage) and its corporate heads were charged when the business earned
well over $100 million serving as a platform for sex traffickers.130 The
government seized the domain, and seven executives were indicted for
facilitating prostitution and money laundering.131 In addition to the charged
conduct, Backpage executives were alleged to have defrauded credit card
companies and used cryptocurrency to conduct transactions.132
The Backpage case shows the breadth of possible illegal activity by web
hosts facilitating sex trafficking transactions. Under the Stop Enabling Sex
Trafficking Act, it is illegal for web hosts to knowingly assist, facilitate, or
support sex trafficking.133 These companies, ranging from Craigslist to
Facebook, may have no intention of facilitating sex trafficking and yet find
themselves as the host enabling sex trafficking networks around the world.134
Either the company itself or its employees may face some form of criminal
liability. Or they may feel the threat of criminal liability and are reluctant to
come forward with information about possible sex trafficking for fear of
exposing themselves to charges or negative press. If either the company or
employees were to cooperate with authorities from the outset, investigators
could obtain access to vast amounts of information on traffickers, including
names, locations, or financial sources. Even if traffickers use obscuring
tactics when using the websites such as false identities or cryptocurrencies,
that information can still lead to substantial investigative developments.135
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While these groups of actors are illustrative examples of those with
valuable information about sex trafficking, they are far from the only ones.136
The breadth of possible perpetrators involved in sex trafficking demonstrates
the rich variety of sources available to fuel an investigation. The common
practice of relying on victims to develop chargeable cases against traffickers
is not necessary. Investigators must change the perpetrator’s motives and
incentivize them to bring information to investigators instead of maintaining
the secrecy that allows trafficking rings to thrive.
III. ANTITRUST DIVISION’S AMNESTY PROGRAM
This Part will examine the Antitrust Division’s Amnesty Program,
focusing on both its history and its functioning. First, I explore the history
and development of the Amnesty Program, explaining how it grew from an
ambiguous, little-used policy to the centerpiece of market manipulation
prosecution. Second, I discuss how the program operates for both
investigators and participants. Finally, I examine the underlying reasons
motivating the Department of Justice to implement and rely upon the
Amnesty Program.
A. ANTITRUST DIVISION AND AMNESTY PROGRAM OVERVIEW

In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Act to respond to corporations
forming monopolies to control the marketplace.137 Today, the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice pursues criminal charges against
companies that agree with competitors to fix prices, divide markets to curtail
consumer choices, or to rig bids at the expense of the consumer.138
Agreements between competitors range in size and scope, from rigging bids

136
Other examples of businesses that provide services for traffickers, such as hotels,
restaurants, taxi services, landlords leasing to traffickers, and telephone dispatchers, are called
“secondary profiteers.” Hughes, supra note 37, at 40. Employees of these businesses may be
knowledgeable or complicit.
137
Dick Thornburgh, Celebrating the Sherman: 100 Years of Antitrust Act: Sherman Act
Commemoration, 1 JUST. 36, 38 (1991).
138
INT’L COMPETITION POL’Y ADVISORY COMM., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FINAL REPORT TO
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR ANTITRUST 163 (2000),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/chapter-4 [https://perma.cc/K8XC-YTWB]. Market competitors
engage in bid rigging when they “agree in advance who will submit the winning bid on a
contract being let through the competitive bidding process,” which has the effect of artificially
raising prices passed down to consumers. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PRICE FIXING, BID RIGGING,
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on foreclosure auctions in Palm Beach County, Florida139 to international
price fixing on auto parts sold to the largest automakers around the world.140
Antitrust violations, like sex trafficking crimes, are defined by their
secrecy and difficulty to detect.141 Agreements between companies to fix
prices illegally or rig bids for services are themselves crimes.142 To reach
these agreements, companies must trust each other not to be detected, as any
outside detection leading back to investigators assures mutual destruction.143
From the perspective of cartel members, trust among participants is
paramount to maintaining the lucrative windfalls companies gain through
market manipulation.144
It is the cartel’s success that motivates the Antitrust Division’s leniency
program.145 The leniency program “provide[s] enforcers with an
investigative tool to uncover cartels that may have otherwise gone undetected
and continued to harm consumers.”146 Fearing that existing investigative
tactics were not detecting many Sherman Act violations, the Division
implemented the first iteration of the Amnesty Program in 1978.147 Under the
1978 model, corporations who self-reported their own illegal cartel activity
were eligible for complete immunity from prosecution.148 However, leniency
was only available to corporations who reported conduct that was not already
under investigation by the DOJ.149 And even if a company met this
requirement, prosecutors still retained discretion about whether to grant
immunity.150 To guide whether amnesty should be granted, prosecutors relied
139
Third Real Estate Investor Pleads Guilty to Bid Rigging in Florida Online Foreclosure
Auctions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/third-realestate-investor-pleads-guilty-bid-rigging-florida-online-foreclosure-auctions [https://perma
.cc/5RWW-STU6].
140
See, e.g., Plea Agreement at 2–3, United States v. NGK Spark Plug Co., Ltd., No. 14cr-20494-GCS (E.D. Mich. Oct. 8, 2014); Plea Agreement at 3–4, United States v. Corning
Int’l Kabushiki Kaisha, No. 16-20357 (E.D. Mich. May 16, 2016).
141
See Colino, supra note 22, at 538; Fraser, supra note 23, at 1018.
142
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143
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144
See Hammond, Detecting and Deterring, supra note 27, at 5.
145
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on seven specific, yet amorphous, requirements that cooperating companies
must have met. Among these requirements, “the DOJ should not reasonably
expect to become aware of the undercover cartel without the report of the
leniency applicant” and consideration would be given “to the ‘candor and
completeness’ with which the firm reported the violation . . . .”151
Because the program required a demanding and unclear standard for
amnesty, it was rarely used and did not result in many successful
prosecutions.152 It was especially unsuccessful in aiding detection of larger
international cartels; none were discovered in the fifteen years of the
program’s active implementation.153 Defense attorneys advising clients on
criminal antitrust matters were unable to determine whether their clients
would qualify for leniency, and as such would not recommend cooperating
with the government through the program.154 In response to flagging efficacy,
the Division overhauled the program in 1993, lowering the requirements to
qualify for amnesty, offering it to more actors within cartels, and, depending
on the level of cooperation, making immunity automatic to participants.155
The program was the first of its kind for the Department of Justice, as other
sections relied exclusively on prosecutorial discretion for granting
immunity.156 The update included three major revisions. First, amnesty is
automatically granted when no pre-existing investigations exist. This differs
from the previous policy that allowed amnesty to be withheld.157 Second,
leniency may still be available even if the Division’s investigation is already

151

Id.
See Hammond, Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 24, at 2.
153
Hammond, Detecting and Deterring, supra note 27, at 1.
154
See Fraser, supra note 23, at 1015.
155
Hammond, Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 24, at 2; Michael
A. Geibelson & Matthew D. Taggart, The Antitrust Division’s Amnesty Program: An Update,
ROBINS, KAPLAN, MILLER & CIRESI LLP, https://www.robinskaplan.com/-/media/pdfs/theantitrust-division-s-amnesty-program-an-update.pdf [https://perma.cc/UQ9T-CDG6].
156
See Colino, supra note 22, at 555; Gary Spratling, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.,
Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Making Companies an Offer They Shouldn’t Refuse: The
Antitrust Division’s Corporate Leniency Policy—An Update, Presented at The Bar
Association of the District of Columbia’s 35th Annual Symposium on Associations and
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underway.158 Third, for corporations that qualify, all officers and employees
who agree to cooperate also receive automatic amnesty.159
By all measures, the 1993 Amnesty Program policy changes represented
an unqualified success in investigating and prosecuting illegal cartels.160
Deputy attorneys general from both Democratic and Republican
administrations uniformly agree that the Amnesty Program is the “single
greatest investigative tool available to anti-cartel enforcers.”161 In the first six
years of the program, applications for leniency increased by over twenty
times compared to the previous iteration of the program.162 From 1996–2003,
when the leniency program was more widely understood and trusted by
companies and defense attorneys, the Division assessed over $5 billion in
fines, with over 90% resulting from investigations assisted by leniency
applicants.163 The Amnesty Program is also quantitatively more effective at
identifying cartels than all search warrants, secret audio or videotape, and
FBI interrogations combined.164
The success of the Division’s leniency program has expanded to other
investigative divisions, both in the DOJ and around the world. Within the
DOJ, the Fraud Section of the Criminal Division has adopted its own version
for investigating Foreign Corrupt Practices Act cases, formalizing its

158
Hammond, Detecting and Deterring, supra note 27, at 2; Hammond, Evolution of
Criminal Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 24, at 2.
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program in 2018 after a successful two-year trial implementation.165 Based
on the success of the United States’ Amnesty Program, countries around the
world have adopted their own versions, including Canada, Brazil, the United
Kingdom, Germany, Hong Kong, and South Korea, among others.166
B. THE FUNCTION OF THE ANTITRUST AMNESTY PROGRAM

To receive amnesty protections, an applicant is not required to meet an
evidentiary sufficiency threshold, meaning that the applicant does not have
to provide enough evidence on their own to substantiate charges against
another cartel participant.167 The evidence only needs to be substantial
enough to warrant opening an investigation.168 In some instances, a leniency
applicant is an integral player in the cartel and thus can provide enough
evidence themselves to bring charges against other companies. In other
instances, an amnesty applicant helps facilitate the cartel and is thus exposed
to criminal liability but is not one of the main conspirators and cannot provide
information about the full scope of the scheme.169 Previous applicants in this
position have provided information that allowed investigators to obtain
search warrants for more culpable cartel members, leading to charges. In one
instance, a successful leniency applicant brought information to the attention
of the Antitrust Division that, through further investigation, led to six
conspirators pleading guilty and over $300 million in fines.170
For each specific cartel, only one amnesty application is granted.171 To
receive leniency, companies are required to cooperate throughout the length

165
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of the investigation.172 The company receiving amnesty must disclose all
relevant facts, produce all unprivileged documents and communications as
requested by the Division, and make their officers and employees available
for interview, among other obligations.173 Cooperators can be sent back into
the cartel while working with the government for evidence gathering
purposes, such as covertly recording conspiratorial meetings.174 While it is
rare, leniency applicants can have their agreement revoked if they do not
provide the requisite information requested by the government or if the
government later learns that the leniency applicant was untruthful or
withholding of information.175
There is one important limitation on who can receive amnesty: the
applicant cannot have “coerced another party to take part in the offense and
must not be ‘the’ instigator or ‘the’ leader.”176 For schemes in which there is
a single organizer or single ringleader, that company or actor is not eligible
for amnesty.177 However, if the conspiracy is among two or more coconspirators that share equal or near-equal culpability, then all conspirators
are eligible for amnesty protections.178 This balancing prevents the most
culpable participant in the scheme from receiving immunity for providing
information against lesser participants in the trafficking scheme, while still
offering cooperation opportunities for lesser or equally culpable
participants.179
C. PHILOSOPHICAL JUSTIFICATION OF THE AMNESTY PROGRAM

The leniency program increases detection of illegal cartels. Because
illegal antitrust violations are so secretive, there are not many avenues
through which investigators can pierce the cone of silence shared by co-
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conspirators. Offering a leniency program allows for discovery of massive
international cartels that otherwise would never be detected.180
One common objection to the Amnesty Program is that individuals and
companies who are criminally liable and have committed conduct that
deserves to be punished benefit unfairly.181 However, this objection creates a
false dichotomy. Implementing a leniency program is not a choice between
punishing all perpetrators or punishing only a few. Rather, it is a decision to
hold most of the culpable actors of a cartel accountable when the alternative
is holding none of them accountable, because the cartel would otherwise go
undetected. Discovering and stopping market manipulation provides the
greatest benefits to consumers.182 While the costs of immunizing a criminal
actor are high, most members of the cartel are ultimately held accountable,
and the public benefits from the cease in the market manipulation.183
Working with leniency applicants also allows the Antitrust Division to
begin investigating specific cartels as early as possible. With a cooperator,
investigators can covertly oversee a live, ongoing conspiracy.184 Early
detection helps avoid running out of time before decisions can be made on
whether to bring charges,185 even if the conspiracy has been broken or stops
for any reason, which starts the clock on the five-year statute of limitations.186
Cooperating companies allow the government to expedite many investigative
processes.187 For instance, where the Antitrust Division would have to send
subpoenas to companies and engage in a protracted back-and-forth about
subpoena compliance, amnesty applicants are required to provide requested
documentation and information in a timely manner or risk losing cooperation
credit.188
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The Amnesty Program also changes the mindset of cartel participants.
Without the Amnesty Program, a cartel participant’s only incentive is to
covertly continue the illicit operation.189 However, when companies are
aware that there is only one get-out-of-jail free card, “it will induce
organizations already under investigation to abandon the cartel stonewall,
race to the government, and provide evidence against the other cartel
members.”190 The leniency program creates the omnipresent threat of
government intervention.
While many cartel participants have benefited from receiving amnesty,
the Antitrust Division still has limits to ensure that wrongdoers are properly
punished. First, the fact that the rule only allows one leniency applicant per
criminal cartel limits potential abuses of leniency.191 Second, even if a
cooperator successfully receives immunity, those affected by their conduct
can still bring civil claims against them, so they may still feel some negative
impact by coming forward.192 These limits still ensure that cooperators are
held to account in some way, without frustrating the Division’s purpose of
detecting as many illegal cartels as possible.
IV. AMNESTY PROGRAM PROPOSAL FOR SEX TRAFFICKING
INVESTIGATIONS
This Part will demonstrate the benefits of a leniency program applied to
sex trafficking prosecutions. While sex trafficking and antitrust violations do
not appear facially similar, they share two key characteristics. First, criminal
activity for both is conducted secretively, and is thus difficult to detect.
Second, investigations into said criminal activity are primarily initiated
through outside individuals or corporations bringing the illicit conduct to the
attention of investigators. The Antitrust Division’s Leniency Program
recognizes both realities and counteracts them by enabling greater detection.
Because of these commonalities between antitrust and sex trafficking, offices
prosecuting sex trafficking should implement their own version of a leniency
program.
Like the Antitrust Division’s program, a leniency program in sex
trafficking would be available to anyone involved in furthering the scheme.
Because of the many associated crimes frequently committed by individuals
engaging in trafficking (e.g., money laundering, prostitution, visa fraud), any
person offering information on sex trafficking can receive immunity for any
189
190
191
192
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criminal activity associated with the enterprise. A leniency program gives
those individuals an option to alert authorities without fearing for their own
freedom. Thus, for those who would consider reporting but are afraid of their
own criminal liability, a leniency program removes the incentive not to
report. This is especially beneficial given the number of ancillary participants
(for example, property owners, bank employees, johns) whose conduct may
or may not be illegal. In many instances, potential leniency applicants may
not have violated any laws but fear that they have. A leniency program can
eliminate questions about whether their conduct is illegal and whether they
should report.
A leniency program also changes the incentive structures of those
within the criminal enterprise. Secret criminal organizations are strong
because everyone shares the same motivation to maintain the secrecy. The
Amnesty Program undermines the trust among conspirators to remain silent
because each member has the option to report conduct to the government. If
conspirators face a persistent threat that one person can be the first in the
proverbial lifeboat by reporting their conduct to investigators, this will
undermine the trust necessary to maintain secrecy, a critical aspect in
trafficking. The Antitrust Division’s model adds competing motivations for
conspirators that can blow up the entire criminal enterprise.
As with the Antitrust Division’s program, a trafficking leniency
program would consider a number of preconditions, including whether the
government was already aware of the trafficking organization, whether the
applicant provides all requested information, and whether the applicant
agrees to cooperate throughout the life of the investigation and
prosecution.193 The Division’s bar on granting amnesty to leaders or
organizers also would apply to ensure that the most culpable are not
immunized only to turn on lesser offenders.194 It would not serve the aims of
justice if the leader of a trafficking organization could obtain immunity only
to testify against associates who acted based on his direction.
A leniency program also aligns with current methods for pursuing sex
trafficking since those investigations are already reliant on others to bring
forth information of illicit activity. The program does not require law
enforcement to do anything differently or require additional expenditures to
develop proactive measures. By offering an amnesty program, those within
an illicit scheme are incentivized to come forward, adding many new sources
of information to begin investigations. There are no additional financial
burdens imposed on investigative bodies. An investigation itself would
193
194
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proceed as it normally does. The only difference from the current, victimfocused model of investigation is that this approach would increase the
methods available to begin investigations into sex trafficking. This is an
especially key facet given legislative reticence and lack of availability of
funds to expand investigative resources.195 A leniency program would require
no increase in resources while potentially offering a great increase in
detection of criminal activity.
Underlying the leniency program is the philosophical determination that
detection is the most important facet when investigating criminal cartels. The
Antitrust Division has weighed the considerations and has concluded that
detecting and stopping criminal cartels from operating and harming the
American consumer is their paramount concern.196 The cost of holding most,
but not all, participants criminally accountable is a worthwhile price. The
same logic can be applied to sex trafficking. As in antitrust crimes, the
government is not presented with a choice between prosecuting all
perpetrators or just a few. Rather, it faces a decision between holding most
accountable or holding none accountable, because the trafficking scheme
would not have been discovered otherwise. Recognizing the reality that great
amounts of trafficking are not otherwise detected makes that tradeoff
worthwhile.
A leniency program also aligns with the victim-centered approach
established through the TVPA. By implementing a leniency program,
detection of cases should rise. Greater detection leads to liberation of more
women and girls trapped in sex trafficking schemes around the world. As a
result, more women and girls regain their agency and autonomy. If
Congress’s ultimate goal of eradicating sex trafficking is to ever be realized,
the government must start by increasing detection. An amnesty program
furthers this purpose.
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An amnesty program also can relieve the burden on victims to sustain
an entire investigation. Because avenues for starting an investigation
increase, the victim is less likely to be saddled with the burden of forming
the core of the investigation. Her testimony may ultimately be necessary, but
she does not have to be the starting point of all gathered evidence. Instead of
relying heavily on victims from the outset, investigations will originate and
grow from individuals who have agreed to cooperate throughout the life of
the investigation. Not only will more victims be saved from their traffickers,
but they will also not have to relive their traumas repeatedly through constant
investigative interviews. Instead, victims will have the opportunity to focus
solely on their recovery from the abuse.
For perpetrators to come forward, an automatic amnesty program is
necessary to combat sex trafficking more effectively, and we cannot continue
to rely on prosecutors granting immunity on an ad hoc basis. The revisions
to the Antitrust Division’s Amnesty Program demonstrate the importance of
having clear standards in both how to qualify for immunity and what one
gains from cooperating. It was unclear in the first version of the program
whether immunity would actually be granted, so cooperators did not feel
comfortable coming forward. Only when the process for immunity was
formalized did cooperators start coming forward in great numbers. The same
logic applies for sex trafficking. Traffickers already do not report illicit
conduct in the absence of guarantees of immunity. If individualized grants of
immunity were sufficient for incentivizing cooperators, then we would likely
see a significant number of investigations begin with a participant in the
trafficking scheme. In order to have perpetrators report their conduct, the
leniency applicant must trust that they will receive immunity protections, and
not be punished, if they come forward.
CONCLUSION
The current state of sex trafficking investigations is at a standstill.
Participants in sex trafficking rings have every incentive to stay quiet and not
report illicit conduct to authorities, and investigators are unable to detect
many existing trafficking schemes. Cartel investigators faced the same
problems, which reflects the brilliance of the Antitrust Division’s Amnesty
Program. By offering immunity to only one cartel participant in exchange for
voluntary cooperation, the leniency program changes the incentives for those
in the criminal agreement and increases detection of covert criminal
enterprises. No additional resources are required to implement the program,
since the only change is the voluntary cooperation of criminal participants.
The Antitrust Division’s success, and the subsequent adoption of similar
programs in other Department offices and by other countries around the

664

BINDER

[Vol. 112

world, demonstrates the potential for a similar program for sex trafficking.
The primary purpose of sex trafficking detection and investigation is not
about holding those accountable to the greatest extent possible. It is about
rescuing victims from the clutches of their traffickers. If vast criminal
organizations can be halted because one participant is immunized, and all of
those being trafficked can be saved, the trade-off is worthwhile. If an amnesty
program had been available, perhaps one of Epstein’s many associates and
employees would have come forward earlier. Maybe then prosecutors would
not have had to rely on 15-year-old evidence, derived almost entirely from
victim testimony. Maybe then we could have stopped a globe-spanning sex
trafficking scheme decades earlier. Perhaps we can still halt countless other
schemes that have gone and continue to go undetected.

